The blowout of the Macondo well on April 20, 2010, led to enormous consequences for the individuals involved in the drilling operations, and for their families. Eleven workers on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig lost their lives and 16 others were seriously injured. There were also enormous consequences for the companies involved in the drilling operations, to the Gulf of Mexico environment, and to the economy of the region and beyond. The flow continued for nearly 3 months before the well could be completely killed, during which time, nearly 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the gulf. Macondo Well-Deepwater Horizon Blowout examines the causes of the blowout and provides a series of recommendations, for both the oil and gas industry and government regulators, intended to reduce the likelihood and impact of any future losses of well control during offshore drilling. According to this report, companies involved in offshore drilling should take a "system safety" approach to anticipating and managing possible dangers at every level of operation -- from ensuring the integrity of wells to designing blowout preventers that function under all foreseeable conditions-- in order to reduce the risk of another accident as catastrophic as the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. In addition, an enhanced regulatory approach should combine strong industry safety goals with mandatory oversight at critical points during drilling operations. Macondo Well-Deepwater Horizon Blowout discusses ultimate responsibility and accountability for well integrity and safety of offshore equipment, formal system safety education and training of personnel engaged in offshore drilling, and guidelines that should be established so that well designs incorporate protection against the various credible risks associated with the drilling and abandonment process. This book will be of interest to professionals in the oil and gas industry, government decision makers, environmental advocacy groups, and others who seek an understanding of the processes involved in order to ensure safety in undertakings of this nature.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can be deployed in a variety of ways, and can cause loss of life, injury, and property damage in both military and civilian environments. Terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals often choose IEDs because the ingredients, components, and instructions required to make IEDs are highly accessible. In many cases, precursor chemicals enable this criminal use of IEDs because they are used in the manufacture of homemade explosives (HMEs), which are often used as a component of IEDs. Many precursor chemicals are frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal use. Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. Other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for HMEs to be used in IEDs. Although IED attacks have been less frequent in the United States than in other countries, IEDs remain a persistent domestic threat. Restricting access to precursor chemicals might contribute to reducing the threat of IED attacks and in turn prevent potentially devastating bombings, save lives, and reduce financial impacts. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals prioritizes precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs and analyzes the movement of those chemicals through United States commercial supply chains and identifies potential vulnerabilities. This report examines current United States and international regulation of the chemicals, and compares the economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies. Table of Contents Front Matter Summary 1 Introduction 2 Precursor Chemicals Used to Make Homemade Explosives 3 Domestic Chemical Supply Chain 4 International Regulations 5 Assessing Possible Control Strategies 6 Potential Approaches to Restricting Malicious Actors' Access to Precursor Chemicals: Conclusions and Recommendations References Appendix A: Acronyms Appendix B: Risk and Risk Management Appendix C: History of High-Profile Bombing Attacks Appendix D: Group A Chemical Supply Chains Appendix E: International Questions Appendix F: Training Materials Appendix G: Methods and Limitations of Regulatory Assessment Appendix H: Examples of Retail-Level Control Strategies and Other Measures or Activities Appendix I: Committee Member and Staff Biographies

This Manual is reissued under the authority of and in accordance with DoD Instruction 4145.26 (Reference (a)) and, accordingly, is applicable to all contractual actions entered into on or after the reissue date. The prior DoD 4145.26-M (Reference (b)), dated September 16, 1997, is hereby rescinded and superseded, yet will remain applicable and effective for contractual actions entered into on or after September 16, 1997 and before the reissue date. The Manual provides safety standards common to DoD and private industry ammunition and explosives (AE), operations, and facilities performing AE work or AE services under DoD contracts, subcontracts, purchase orders, or other procurement methods. DoD 6055.9-STD (Reference (c)) establishes these AE safety standards and serves as the primary source document for this Manual. The explosives safety requirements included in this Manual are consistent with Reference (c) so that AE safety standards for DoD Components and DoD contractors are equivalent.

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Regulations Governing The Manufacture, Storage, Sale And Use Of Explosive And Combustible Substances New York (N.Y.). Municipal explosives commission Science; Chemistry; Industrial & Technical; Explosives; Science / Chemistry / Industrial & Technical; Technology & Engineering / Chemical & Biochemical

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Pamphlet, Issues 10-11 Institute of Makers of Explosives Science; Chemistry; Industrial & Technical; Explosives; Science / Chemistry / Industrial & Technical; Technology & Engineering / Chemical & Biochemical

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfectionssuch as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed worksworldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.++++The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Report Of The Committee Appointed By The Citizens Of Cincinnati, April 26, 1838, To Enquire Into The Causes Of The Explosion Of The Moselle: And To Suggest Such Preventive Measures As May Be Best Calculated To Guard Hereafter Against Such Occurrences Committee on the Explosion of the Moselle (Cincinnati, Ohio) A. Flash, 1838

This guide lists curios or relics firearms for gun collectors. As set out in the regulations (27 CFR 478.11), curios or relics include firearms which are of special interest to collectors by reason of some quality other than is associated with firearms intended for sporting use or as offensive or defensive weapons. This publication is a cumulative digest of determinations made by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and is not inclusive of all weapons meeting curio or relic classification (i.e., firearms manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current date).

This easy-to-read 8x10" handbook is for persons interested in the business of importing, manufacturing and dealing in firearms defined by the National Firearms Act (NFA) or persons intending to go into an NFA firearms business. It should also be helpful to collectors of NFA firearms and other persons with questions about the application of the NFA. This publication is not a law book. It is intended as a user friendly reference book enabling the user to quickly find answers to questions concerning the NFA.

Attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, Oklahoma City and other places indicate that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are among the weapons of choice of terrorists throughout the world. Scientists and engineers have developed various technologies that have been used to counter individual IED attacks, but events in Iraq and elsewhere indicate that the effectiveness of IEDs as weapons of asymmetric warfare remains. The Office of Naval Research has asked The National Research Council to examine the current state of knowledge and practice in the prevention, detection, and mitigation of the effects of IEDs and make recommendations for avenues of research toward the goal of making these devices an ineffective tool of asymmetric warfare. The book includes recommendations such as identifying the most important and most vulnerable elements in the chain of events leading up to an IED attack, determining how resources can be controlled in order to prevent the construction of IEDs, new analytical methods and data modeling to predict the ever-changing behavior of insurgents/terrorists, a deeper understanding of social divisions in societies, enhanced capabilities for persistent surveillance, and improved IED detection capabilities. Table of Contents Front Matter Summary References Appendix A Committee Membership Appendix B Summary of Data-Gathering Meetings Appendix C Glossary

Existing and Potential Standoff Explosives Detection Techniques examines the scientific techniques currently used as the basis for explosives detection and determines whether other techniques might provide promising research avenues with possible pathways to new detection protocols. This report describe the characteristics of explosives, bombs, and their components that are or might be used to provide a signature for exploitation in detection technology; considers scientific techniques for exploiting these characteristics to detect explosives and explosive devices; discusses the potential for integrating such techniques into detection systems that would have sufficient sensitivity without an unacceptable false-positive rate; and proposes areas for research that might be expected to yield significant advances in practical explosives and bomb detection technology in the near, mid, and long term.

In response to the rising concern of the American public over illegal bombings, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms asked the National Research Council to examine possible mechanisms for reducing this threat. The committee examined four approaches to reducing the bombing threat: addition of detection markers to explosives for pre-blast detection, addition of identification taggants to explosives for post-blast identification of bombers, possible means to render common explosive materials inert, and placing controls on explosives and their precursors. The book makes several recommendations to reduce the number of criminal bombings in this country. Table of Contents Front Matter Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Improving the Capability to Detect Explosives 3 Taggants for Preblast and Postblast Identification of Explosives 4 Rendering Explosive Materials Inert 5 Limiting Criminal Access to Explosives and Precursor Chemicals Bibliography Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J Appendix K Appendix L Appendix M Appendix N Appendix O

On November 19, 2001 the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created as a separate entity within the U.S. Department of Transportation through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The act also mandated that all checked baggage on U.S. flights be scanned by explosive detection systems (EDSs) for the presence of threats. These systems needed to be deployed quickly and universally, but could not be made available everywhere. As a result the TSA emphasized the procurement and installation of certified systems where EDSs were not yet available. Computer tomography (CT)-based systems became the certified method or place-holder for EDSs. CT systems cannot detect explosives but instead create images of potential threats that can be compared to criteria to determine if they are real threats. The TSA has placed a great emphasis on high level detections in order to slow false negatives or missed detections. As a result there is abundance in false positives or false alarms.
In order to get a better handle on these false positives the National Research Council (NRC) was asked to examine the technology of current aviation-security EDSs and false positives produced by this equipment. The ad hoc committee assigned to this task examined and evaluated the cases of false positives in the EDSs, assessed the impact of false positive resolution on personnel and resource allocation, and made recommendations on investigating false positives without increase false negatives. To complete their task the committee held four meetings in which they observed security measures at the San Francisco International Airport, heard from employees of DHS and the TSA. Engineering Aviation Security Environments--Reduction of False Alarms in Computed Tomography-Based Screening of Checked Baggage is the result of the committee's investigation. The report includes key conclusions and findings, an overview of EDSs, and recommendations made by the committee.

Countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED)s is a challenging, multilayered problem. The IED itself is just the most publicly visible part of an underlying campaign of violence, the IED threat chain. Improving the technical ability to detect the device is a primary objective, but understanding of the goals of the adversary; its sources of materiel, personnel, and money; the sociopolitical environment in which it operates; and other factors, such as the cultural mores that it must observe or override for support, may also be critical for impeding or halting the effective use of IEDs. Disrupting Improvised Explosive Device Terror Campaigns focuses on the human dimension of terror campaigns and also on improving the ability to predict these activities using collected and interpreted data from a variety of sources. A follow-up to the 2007 book, Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices: Basic Research Opportunities, this book summarizes two workshops held in 2008. Table of Contents Front Matter SUMMARY 1 INTRODUCTION 2 FINDING THE WEAK LINKS (WORKSHOP 1) 3 PREDICTING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ACTIVITIES (WORKSHOP 2) 4 WORKSHOP THEMES REFERENCES APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT-GENERATED LISTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS APPENDIX B: LIST OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS APPENDIX C: LIST OF WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS GLOSSARY